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# Attacker can trigger temporary shutdown due to RedStonePriceFeedBase missing gas check

Medium · 0xSimao · CDP stablecoin · 14th March 2025

Finding M-1 of the Felix Price Feeds security review.

- Protocol: https://www.usefelix.xyz/
- Report: /reports/felix
- Source: https://github.com/0xSimao/audits/blob/main/0xSimao/2025-03-14-felix.pdf

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**Description:**

RedStonePriceFeedBase::_getCurrentRedStoneResponse() does not check gas left in the catch block, allowing attackers to forward just a bit of gas to make the call to chainlink revert and trigger a temporary shutdown.

**Impact:**

Protocol DoS.

**Recommended Mitigation:**

See the LiquityV2 check [here](https://github.com/liquity/bold/blob/main/contracts/src/PriceFeeds/MainnetPriceFeedBase.sol#L106).

**0xSimao:**

Fixed in [#a0041e1](https://github.com/felixprotocol/felix-contracts/commit/a0041e1b53357b8bcce0cb7d09d825e4aea28c2f).

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Related findings:

- [PriceFeed: First owner isn't set as valid keeper](https://0xsimao.com/findings/nftperp-i-price-isn-valid-keeper): Nftperp Exchange
- [PriceFeed: Two step owner transfers are safer](https://0xsimao.com/findings/nftperp-i-price-two-transfers-safer): Nftperp Exchange
- [Attacker can block LayerZero channel due to missing check of minimum gas passed](https://0xsimao.com/findings/tapioca-dao-layer-zero-channel-gas): Tapioca DAO
- [OstiumTrading::closeTradeMarket() and OstiumTrading::topUpCollateral() are missing pending trigger checks](https://0xsimao.com/findings/ostium-close-trade-top-collateral): Ostium
