# Vault cap is not considered in the maxDeposit() calculations, which may make deposits fail Medium · Three Sigma · Lending · 2nd December 2024 Finding 3S-MORE-M01 of the MORE Optimizer security review. - Protocol: https://www.more.markets/ - Report: /reports/more-optimizer - Source: https://github.com/0xsimao/audits/blob/main/Three%20Sigma/2024-12-02-more-markets.pdf --- ### Description LoopStrategy::maxDeposit() does not consider the vault cap, which limits the amount that can be deposited if the utilization rate is close to the targetUtilization. Hence, deposits will revert. ### Recommendation Consider incorporating the maxDeposit() of the vault. ### Status Addressed in [#4793c1c](https://github.com/MoreLabsXYZ/MORE-Optimizers/commit/4793c1c0addd19b463bcd5d14e9bb5ef4baae956). Disclosed by 0xSimao (https://0xsimao.com/). --- Related findings: - [AaveYieldBackend.deposit() DoS when Aave pool is paused, frozen, or at supply cap](https://0xsimao.com/findings/superfluid-aave-yield-deposit-paused): Superfluid Yield Backends - [Withdrawals can fail due to deposits reverting in `completeQueuedWithdrawal()`](https://0xsimao.com/findings/renzo-withdrawals-deposits-complete-withdrawal): Renzo - [`PreDepositVault::maxDeposit/Mint()` are missing `maxDepositLimit` as per the ERC4626 spec](https://0xsimao.com/findings/gaib-deposit-mint-erc4626-spec): GAIB Pre-Vaults - [`maxDeposit` doesn't comply with ERC-4626](https://0xsimao.com/findings/pooltogether-the-prize-layer-for-defi-deposit-comply-erc-4626): PoolTogether Prize Layer