ManagedLeveragedVault::deposit() slippage control on collVaultShares is not intuitive

Summary

ManagedLeveragedVault::deposit() has slippage control for collVaultShares but it applies to the full deposited collateral when the user only gets a share of it due to entry fees.

Vulnerability Detail

The deposit function is:

function deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver, AddCollParams calldata params)
    public
    notPaused
    nonReentrant
    returns (uint256 shares)
{
    BoycoVaultStorage storage b$ = _getBoycoVaultStorage();

    shares = _deposit(assets, receiver);

    IERC20(asset()).forceApprove(address(b$.collVault), assets);
    uint256 collVaultShares = b$.collVault.deposit(assets, address(this));

    if (collVaultShares < params.minSharesOut) revert VaultSlippage(params.minSharesOut, collVaultShares);

    _addColl(collVaultShares, params.upperHint, params.lowerHint);
}

The user deposits assets and pays entry fees. However, the params.minSharesOut parameter is compared against collVaultShares, which comes from converting the whole assets deposited into collateral vault shares. This can be unexpected for users as slippage control on a deposit function should be on the amount the user actually gets (assets minus entry fees), but it currently compares against all assets deposited.

Impact

UX issues. Some users may be caught off guard but it only leads to reverts at max.

Code Snippet

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2025-04-beraborrow-vault-update/pull/1/files#diff-2d972f52027e0ba1065b2de2b424416244bfef9e2a79d2604e1687867f72c91eR278

Tool Used

Manual Review

Recommendation

Apply slippage control to the net collVaultShares the user mints.